The Second Wife (1998) BETTER

The Second Wife (1998) BETTER

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After living long enough to see the birth of five of her great-grandchildren, Elfriede Geiringer died peacefully in her sleep on 2 October 1998 at her home in London. She is buried along with the ashes of her second husband, Otto in Birsfelden's Cemetery.[2]

After Il Postino la Cucinota made other important movie El Día de la Bestia. But after it, except for a brief role in a James Bond Flick, she hadn't had the luck of past beauties like Cardinale, Loren, Lollo, Lissi or Vitti. She even was overshadowed in the media by Monica Belluci.-Still I prefer la Cuccinota to la Belluci.-The subject of this film, isn't new on the Italian cinema. A young second wife have sex with his husband young son.So I suppose that was the reason that this film isn't famous.Unlike other Italian beauties, la Cuccinota is full dressed in all the movies. Still she her voluptuous figure and talent makes this film erotic.She looks sexy in very long nightdresses.-The movies benefited also by a beautiful cinematography, beautiful places and strong performances specially of Lazar Litovski as the husband.-

The trial judge refused to allow the husband in a dissolution proceeding to render an opinion as to the value of his separate property house at the time he acquired it. The house later became community property. Because the trial judge refused the husband's proffered testimony, he consequently ruled that the husband had failed to trace any separate interest in the property. The result is a judgment of dissolution which confers a windfall on the wife by determining that the house was 100 percent community property.

Alan originally acquired the family residence on Laurinda Lane in 1968 when he was married to his first wife, Jill. During the dissolution of that marriage in 1979, Jill received the property and Alan received a note on the property secured by a deed of trust. Later, in June 1983, Jill defaulted on the Laurinda note, and Alan acquired possession of the property through a foreclosure. Alan refinanced the property in August 1983 for $106,500. Concurrent with this refinancing, Alan's second wife, respondent Catherine, executed a quitclaim deed on the property.

In November 1986, while refinancing the Laurinda property to obtain a lower fixed-rate interest, Alan, who had sole title to the house, deeded the property to himself and Catherine as husband and wife as joint tenants. At that time, the outstanding balance due on the trust deed was $105,000. However, in order to qualify for the new interest rate, the bank required a pay-down to $90,000, which Alan financed by a sale of $20,000 worth of Scott Paper stock given to him by his mother. It is uncontroverted that after the 1986 refinancing the parties considered the Laurinda residence as community property.

Third, a strict recordkeeping requirement to establish the value of separate real property later transmuted into community real property runs contrary to the clear legislative purpose behind Family Code section 2640. As our Supreme Court recently noted in In re Marriage of Walrath (1998) 17 Cal. 4th 907 [72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 856, 952 P.2d 1124] section 2640 was born of an attempt to " 'avoid the inequity that may result in a case where property taken in joint tenancy form is divided equally between the spouses despite a showing that one spouse contributed a substantial portion of separate funds to the acquisition.' " (Walrath, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 915, quoting Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 26 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 4, 1983, p. 4.)

Fellatio in an unusual place A young wife who was in heat to eat sperm smiles and has sex for the second time! The body whose sensitivity continues to increase seeks sperm eating over and over again![Part 1]

Yet the witness remained polite throughout, never once leapingover the table, grabbing an inquisitor by his ears and screaming,"Hey, flannel mouth--does the phrase 'posturing hypocrite windbag'ring a bell?" Indeed, I sometimes fantasize about beingsubpoenaed to such a hearing, just for the chance to hit back.I've got my answers ready: "Excuse me, sir; did you develop yourdevotion to morality before or after you left your second wifefor that podiatrist's assistant?" "Senator, when you ask about acover-up, are you referring to that pathetically unconvincingtoupee?" "I'll make you an offer, Congressman. You put away thosenotes, and I'll answer questions your staff didn't write foryou." I know I'll be risking a contempt-of-Congress citation. Butremember what the lawyer said when a pompous judge asked him,"Counselor, are you trying to show contempt for this court?" "No,your honor," the lawyer replied. "I'm trying to conceal it."

The wife filed for divorce from the parties' second marriage [Note 1] on the ground that there had been an irretrievable breakdown in the marriage. The wife sought physical and legal custody of the couple's two children [Note 2] and also sought leave to remove the children to Scotland, the wife's native land. After a two-day trial, a judgment of divorce nisi issued on July 17, 2007, which (pertinent to this appeal) denied the request to remove the children to Scotland, and awarded the parents joint legal custody. [Note 3] The wife appeals these two components of the judgment.

The probate judge applied the correct legal standard (i.e., the real advantage test) and we discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's conclusion that removal to Scotland is not in these children's best interest. Although the judge found that several factors demonstrated a "real advantage" to the wife and derivatively to the children should they be allowed to move to Scotland, [Note 5] he did not err in concluding that removal at this time was not in the children's best interest. Among other things, the record supported the judge's findings that the children have resided primarily in the United States, that the older child has strong friendships with classmates here, that the children have close and important relationships with the husband, that the children enjoy their visits with the husband, [Note 6] that the children enjoy their relationship with the husband's extended family, that the children have a limited relationship with the wife's extended family in Scotland, that the children will be adversely affected emotionally by being removed to Scotland, and that the son's developmental progress will be negatively affected if he were to be removed to Scotland. [Note 7] The record also supported the judge's finding that removal would not be in the best interest of the children's mental health and that the children need regular involvement with their father. In short, the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the wife's request to remove the children to Scotland. [Note 8], [Note 9]

2. Legal custody. We also discern no abuse of discretion in the award of joint legal custody. See Kendall v. Kendall, 426 Mass. 238 , 251 (1997). Custody is to be determined based on the best interests of the children. Freedman v. Freedman, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 519 , 522 (2000). Although there is evidence, as the mother contends, of animosity and acrimony between the parties, the probate judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that the parties have an ability and a willingness to share major decision-making regarding the children's welfare. There was, for example, no evidence that the tension between the parties precluded them from discussing, planning, or agreeing upon important medical or educational issues in the lives of their children. Indeed, to the contrary, the wife herself conceded that both parents should remain involved in the children's school and medical issues. See Doe v. Doe, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 499 , 502 (1983) (while conflict between the parties existed, court nevertheless upheld award of joint legal custody).

[Note 5] The judge found that the wife would be happier in Scotland and that, derivatively, the children would also benefit. He found a genuine advantage to the wife in returning to her native land and her extended family, including increased employment opportunities. In light of these findings, we see no merit in the wife's argument that the judge did not consider her interests in determining the best interests of the children.

[Note 6] We disagree with the wife's contention that the judge erred when he concluded that the children's exposure to Scotland was limited. The evidence showed that the children have lived their entire lives in the United States, that the son has only visited Scotland twice, and that, while the daughter has visited Scotland eight times, the longest of those trips was three weeks.

[Note 7] Contrary to the wife's contention, the record also supported the judge's finding that the children's special needs required the involvement of both parents. The record demonstrates that the daughter perceives her father as the victim of the divorce, that she believes that the conflict between her parents is her fault, and that she "remains hyper vigilant about the loss of the family . . . ." There is also evidence that the son has medical and psychological needs, has not been very open about his parents' divorce, and acts out during transitions between parents.

[Note 8] We are unpersuaded by the wife's argument that the judge did not exercise independent judgment, solely adopting the recommendation of the guardian ad litem. While the judge did accept the guardian ad litem's recommendation, it was within his discretion to do so and there is no indication that he did not make an independent determination. See Pizzino v. Miller, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 876 ("It was for the judge to decide whether to credit the guardian's report and testimony"). Furthermore, the supplemental report did not provide any additional recommendations and there is no indication that the judge did not consider the evidence contained therein.

[Note 9] The probate judge did not, as the wife argues, impermissibly place on her the burden to show an improvement in the children's lives. While the judge noted that the wife had "not demonstrated any decided advantage" to the children, he properly considered all the competing interests in reaching his ultimate conclusion as to whether removal was in the children'sbest interests. Rosenthal v. Maney, 51 Mass. App. Ct. at 268 ("We first note that it was not the mother's burden to provide evidence of improvement, but that the factors must be considered collectively"). 2b1af7f3a8